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COMMENTS ON "ABSOLUTE SIMPLICITY" 
James Ross 
1. Introduction. The paper says Aquinas' view of God's simplicity is that 
there are "two sorts of necessity without a real distinction," and no contingency, 
in God. Kretzmann and Stump adapt their own view, which is admittedly weaker 
(pp. 368, 369, 373), from Aquinas by relativising simplicity to "a given initial-
state set of worlds.'" That analysis is applied to solve four problems, two at the 
outset and two at the end. 
Overall, I think the paper does not present Aquinas' basis for simplicity, from 
which no "weakening" is needed, nor does it present Aquinas' grounds for 
denying any "real distinction"2 in God. It says Aquinas held there is no con-
tingency in God, but equivocates on "logical" and "metaphysical" contingency, 
("contingency," as used in the Third Way and SCG I, 85). It does not, in my 
opinion, find a proper role for the fact that although God is some way he might 
not have been, God is not really different from what he might have been, any 
more than he is really changed. 
In brief, I argue that the paper substitutes a logical consequence of God's 
simplicity for Aquinas' explanation, and fails to deliver the explanation it prom-
ises of why there is no real distinction between the suppositionally necessary 
features of God and the absolutely necessary ones. Then, I suggest the doctrine 
of divine simplicity is, strictly, neither necessary nor sufficient for the conclusions 
of the "applications." 
2. The Main. Points. I agree with the denials of all real composition that the 
authors accept from Aquinas, though I'd emphasize that they follow directly 
from the "pure act" doctrine. I would not say, however, that "perfect knowledge" 
and "perfect power" differ in sense while being "identical in reference," as do 
"the morning star" and "the evening star." I think they differ in reference, too, 
but not in referent. Yet, that still does not capture Aquinas' idea that God's 
knowledge and power are the same. 
Using C. I. Lewis' notion of signification ("that on the part of the thing 
required for the given term to apply") and his notion of "intention" ("the other 
expressions that have to apply if the given one does"), we can say non-
synonymous divine predicates differ in intention but have the same signification, 
the same entitative conditions of application (not, in all cases, "across possible 
worlds," unless-indexed and across all worlds, of course). For I use "perfect 
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power" to refer to God's power and "perfect knowledge" to refer to God's 
knowledge; so while there is sameness of referent, there is difference of reference. 
The authors say there are "non-synonymous expressions designating quite distinct 
manifestations of one and the same thing" (italics added); it is, 1 take it, the 
"distinct manifestations" that are referred to. 
The heart of Aquinas' position is, 1 think: that the REAL truth-condition for 
all the divine attributes (whether contingent or necessary) is the same, and would 
have been one and the same, though logically different, had God created diffe-
rently. 1 will explain this, Sec. 3 below, because it suggests what 1 take to be 
a better answer to Kretzmann's and Stump's main problem. (Thus, with God's 
necessary attributes, meaning cannot be equated with truth-conditions.) 
The fact that God's essence is to exist and that the divine attributes are all 
"the same," "without any real distinction," does not permit an account of "iden-
tity" as "numerical" or "Leibnizian" identity. The paper does not talk that way, 
but, by not providing an analysis for "real distinction" and describing the contrary 
sameness as "identity" (pp. 354-55) which is not analysed, it does not warn 
against the "numerical," "Leibnizian" terms that have been used so often recently. 
For Aquinas numerical, "Leibnizian," identity is a RATIONAL relation, not 
a real relation, of an actual individual to itself. (So, "not really the same as" 
does not imply "is really distinct from.") Non-individual real sameness is not 
analysed as Leibnizian or phrased as "everything that's true of the one is, neces-
sarily, true of the other," but only as absence of real distinction. (I skip, for 
now, the issues about FORMAL sameness, and the sameness of real natures in 
many things.) 
The quantification over properties for formulating numerical identity makes 
it incoherent to apply to God, because 'being' is not a property and has no 
properties and, thus, God's being cannot have "all its properties in common 
with" God's essence. And if God's essence were deemed to have or be properties, 
the identity would be false. Moreover, the implicit Platonism of the second-order 
quantification over properties is incompatible with Aquinas' metaphysics. 
Further, God does not have distinct features picked out by predicates with different 
de re truth-conditions (unless they are "world-indexed," and then, the whole 
collection is the same for all worlds). So, the real sameness of God's power and 
knowledge, say, is not with any fidelity to Aquinas' text and time to be analysed 
as Leibnizian identity. 1 think we agree about that. 
The underlying problem is "to resolve the apparent incompatibility of God's 
simplicity and God's free choice." What produces the problem? The combination 
of what God must be and what God chooses to be. Perhaps, the conjunction of 
the logically necessary divine nature with the logically contingent divine electing 
defeats "identity" of nature and choice, causing plurality, not simplicity, in God? 
(It is assumed, apparently, the real sameness, like Leibnizian identity, is necessary 
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and so, holds across possible worlds; Aquinas thinks God is really the same 
thing, no matter what, but not that God is the same, no matter what; it's just 
that "not the same," applied counterfactuaIIy to one thing, does not imply "it is 
really different from" some other way it might have been.) 
The authors also accept that God would have been really different, had he 
done something else or nothing at all. So, God can't have transworld simplicity 
that implies trans world sameness. I do not think Aquinas held that assumption. 
(As I said, simplicity does not imply trans-world sameness for Aquinas, just the 
opposite. But "trans-world difference" is not real difference, either.) Thus, they 
propose to "relativise" simplicity, in part because they think "being the creator 
of Adam" and "not having created at all" are REALL Y DIFFERENT. They 
make simplicity not a trans-world trait but an in-world trait (see pp. 369, 371).3 
The retrenchment is not needed. That's mainly because, in the relevant passages 
of Aquinas, "being really different from," requires real distinction, and thus, 
obtains among actual things, intrinsic principles of being, etc., and does not 
obtain between the actual and entia ration is , or between the way God is and the 
ways God might have been (or any imaginary relatum). Had God done otherwise, 
God would not have been really different at all, just "rationally." 
They say Aquinas holds "that there is no contingency in God himself' (pp. 
367, 369). But there is logical contingency in God by nature, because it is not 
inconsistent that God have done otherwise. They say (p. 367) that follows from 
the suppositional necessity of God's free acts. It does not. On the contrary, 
conditional necessity (suppositional necessity from eternity) not only does not 
preclude logical contingency in God, it ENTAILS IT. So the bothersome duality 
is still to be resolved. They write (p. 367) "Instead, God's nature is altogether 
necessary, either absolutely or conditionally," as if that got rid of the logically 
contingent. And, 'Thomas maintains there is only necessity in God and that 
whatever is true of him is essentially true of him." (p. 369). "Essentially" vs. 
"accidentally," yes; "essentially" as in "of the essence of," no. "Only necessity" 
in contrast to what? 
Aquinas denies "contingency" in God in the sense of "real dependence, with 
real beginning"; he does not deny that God is as he might not have been, e.g. 
creator of the world. God is simple in all possible worlds (to talk in recent 
fashion); but different things are true of him in different worlds, though all "the 
world-indexed truths" are the same. (I mention that "possible worlds" talk is 
seriously misleading about God, but like poisons, it has its uses.) 
Whether or not things are contingent, logically, is not a divine choice, as is 
implied (p. 374)4; see Contra Gentiles, I, 85. Nor is contingency, in either sense, 
"logical contingency" or "possibility with real dependence," incompatible with 
a situation's being suppositionally necessary, even from eternity. So, saying 
"God's nature is altogether necessary either absolutely or conditionally" (p. 367) 
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is a pun on "necessary" because in one meaning "necessary" precludes logical 
contingency of the same thing and in the other, requires it. 
The authors think the suppositional necessity of God's free act somehow 
defeats a real distinction between the logically contingent attributes and the 
necessary attributes of God (pp. 371-74). How? (My being and my accidents 
are really distinct, yet both are suppositionally necessary ab eternitate from God's 
will.) That's supposed to be the point of the paper. They don't, in the end, tell 
any story about it. They repeat that "the logical distinction between conditionally 
and absolutely necessitated aspects of the divine will does not reflect a metaphys-
ical difference." (p. 372). Why not? They do not show why there is "no basis 
on which to infer a metaphysical distinction within the divine will itself" 
(p.372), by showing what blocks that conclusion. Instead they offer an illustration 
that involves no relevant combination oflogical and conditional necessity at all. 
The suppositional necessity of God's acting from eternity is not why there is 
no real distinction in God between God's necessary nature and God's free election 
of creatures. The suppositional necessity of God's free act is merely a consequence 
of divine simplicity, freedom and eternity. 
Instead, there is another, a dispositive reason why there is no real distinction 
between the divine nature and the logically contingent "act of creating." 
3. A Better Answer. God's being as he chooses, from eternity, (a) involves 
no change; (b) is not a real difference from a determinate "would otherwise have 
been," (c) is, whatever he chooses, logically necessary for his being free (which 
is a necessary attribute) and (d) is related to his being free as a determinate to 
a determinable, analogically. That's why there is no real distinction between 
the contingent attributes of God and the necessary ones. A determinate cannot 
be related to a determinable as act is to potency; but in the same subject, 
act-potency relation is necessary for a real distinction. (The same reasoning 
applies to God in "different possible worlds.") 
God's choice is no more really distinct from his being than "being red," in a 
thing that must by nature (say) choose its color, is distinct from its being colored, 
given that it is by nature colored. There is no other color-of-it that is actual for 
its-being-red to be really distinct from, either. 
The basic expression involved in the divine simplicity is not the necessary 
identity of a two-name assertion "a = b," but the real sameness of the actual 
red of a thing with the color of the thing, the squeak of a door with the sound 
of it, the rumble of a coach with the sound of it, and so forth. That's real 
sameness. "That's the sound, color, choice ... of it." It is logically contingent, 
even if, say, the violin's sounding that way is a natural necessity and there is 
no other determinate real possibility for its sound. It is the sameness of God's 
knowing (as power), with his knowledge (as act), the sameness of his omnipotence 
with what he does, and of his freedom with what he chooses. 
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It is not the suppositional necessity of his choosing the world that defeats a 
real distinction between being free and acting in a particular way. It is the absence 
of a potency-act relation between God's freedom (being) and God's choice. 
God's choosing is not related to his freedom as realization to capacity. There 
is no such dualism in God. It is related, analogously, as determinate to determin-
able. (I say analogously, because a meaning-relevant truth-condition in some 
contexts is that the determinates form a finite, disjoint, accessible array; here 
they do not.) Thus God's freedom SUBSISTS5 in what God does. (NO MATTER 
WHAT HE DOES). God's necessary being, his freedom, cannot, therefore, be 
really distinct from what God ACTUALLY does, no matter what that might 
have been. Even the actual divine election, as 1 said, compared to some imagined 
alternative, is not "really distinct" from "it."6 
"The necessity of the Creator and his act of creating does not preclude con-
tingency in what is created" (p. 367) can only be true by amphiboly: by "neces-
sary" 's having two senses, one, "absolute necessity" as it combines with 
"Creator" and the other, "suppositional necessity" as it combines with "his act 
of creating." Zeugma. 
So I conclude that suppositional necessity has nothing to do with explaining 
divine simplicity and that it is not so that God's simplicity consists, for Aquinas, 
in "two sorts of necessity without a real distinction" (p. 371). That is a conse-
quence of God's simplicity, not what accounts for it or constitutes it. 
There is no reason to retreat from Aquinas' position to a relativised notion 
(p. 371). Aquinas' insistence upon the sameness of EVERYTHING in God is 
not the assertion that no matter how things had been, the REAL truth-condition 
for everything true of God would have been the same as it is actually. No; the 
real truth-condition for everything that would have been true of God would have 
been the same for everything true of God, in each case, but not, logically, the 
same as in any other case. Yet there is no determinate "would-have-been-instead" 
and no "is really different from," either. 
The notion that God has "no unfulfilled potentialities" is qualified not to imply 
that God has fulfilled potentialities. Otherwise, one might imagine God's freedom 
to be an ability fulfilled by his free act, and therefore, distinct from it. I feel 
sure the authors agree (cf. p. 370). 
To recapitulate, the real color of a thing (I assume for this that colors are real) 
is really the same, for the time the thing is so colored, as its being-colored; there 
is no other reality. The sound of the door IS its squeaking, slamming, or whatever 
it does. So, God's act is to his freedom as determinate to determinable and not 
as fulfillment to capacity, or as exercise to ability. There is no way, then, for 
there to be a real distinction between God's necessary being and God's contingent 
acting, whatever its content. 
That's what needs to be said: "no relation of potency to act between A and 
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B, (where A and B are present in one subject)," entails "no real distinction 
between A and B in that subject." My adding the "determinable-determinate" 
account only glosses Aquinas to make clearer how the contingent but actual in 
God is "really the same" as the necessary, and how that would have been so, 
no matter what. So God's simplicity is "trans-world" and absolute. But the de 
re truth condition for all God's attributes is logically distinct under counterpos-
sibilities. 
It does not, I think, represent Aquinas to say "we cannot accurately say that 
God could have willed not to create" (p. 368). God is, from eternity, a being 
ABLE to have done otherwise; God, creating, is a being able not to: that ability 
subsists in what he does, just as, in our limited way I am able, doing as I am, 
to do something else, (even after the time for doing it has passed). God, not 
having created, would be rationally distinct, but not really distinct from God as 
he is, and not really different. 
The paper offered to show, I take it, that a conceptual difference is all that 
obtains between the nature and the free creative act of God. The analysis did 
not go far enough to show that, or in the direction Aquinas took. To accept the 
proposed "weakening" is just to concede what the opponents have claimed: that 
Aquinas' doctrine of divine simplicity cannot be defended. As far as I can see, 
it can. 
Throughout the paper "necessary" and "contingent" occur in two word-families 
that are not rigidly segregated. Senses of "contingent" in which, for instance, 
God can make things contingent (as will as make contingent things) and in which 
God cannot be contingent or have contingent attributes, are not systematically 
contrasted. 
I agree with the objective, to replace the perspective of a "combination" of 
"necessary" and "contingent" realities in God that presents us with a composition 
we are supposed to explain away. Rightly, they want a perspective that presents 
the conceptual composition of a simple thing for what it is. As I think I have 
shown, Aquinas achieved that. 
4. The Applications. I have the same objection to the first three applications: 
simplicity is not necessary to establish consistency among the attributes; nor is 
it sufficient; even more, it is inconsistent with co-essentiality of all God's "prop-
erties" because "having chosen otherwise than he might have" is a necessary 
attribute that, no matter what, requires a content logically distinct from the 
content required for a 'choice-otherwise'. If the former is essential, the latter 
cannot be. 
If the divine attributes in question are co-essential, they are consistent. That 
the attributes of an actual thing are "the same" presupposes, as a condition 
precedent, that they are consistent. That's why simplicity cannot establish con-
sistency, it presupposes it. Moreover, one cannot infer co-essentiality from 
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simplicity, at least not by any argument given. And, if I am right, we cannot 
so infer, because, if the determinable is essential, then the determinate must not 
be (unless we are talking about necessities of nature, e.g. that grass is green, as 
well as colored; I do not think that applies because such necessities of nature 
are, in my opinion at least, from the will of God, see note 4.) That has the result 
that in a being determinable by nature, simplicity entails non-co-essentiality 
among some attributes. 
For example, simplicity is not needed (p. 375) to resolve an "apparent incom-
patability of omnipotence and impeccability"; for, God need only be essentially 
almighty, (able to effect whatever is logically contingent in itself), and essentially 
good, for it to be inconsistent for him to bring about his own acting wrongly, 
whether or not the two attributes ("almighty" and "perfectly good") are really 
the same. 
Similarly, to settle the "seeming paradox of essential goodness" and (i) impec-
cability and (ii) divine free choice, we need only observe that freedom, for 
Aquinas, is not "the ability to do right and wrong" (p. 358), and indeed, that, 
in some cases, what one does willingly is necessitated (p. 363). A being with 
the ability to act rightly, but without defect of knowledge or resolution, has no 
source for wrongdoing and is both free and impeccable (pp. 362, 363). Again 
it matters not to this argument whether the attributes are really the same, only 
whether they are essential. The notion of simplicity does not function in the 
explanations. 
Two other applications come at the end. The first suggests, as did Aquinas, 
that the divine nature, the very being of God, is the standard of moral law . That 
avoids an arbitrary exercise of divine authority that could have had any outcome 
at all (voluntarism), or the oddity of God's adhering to some unexplained external 
moral standard. Again, to avoid those outcomes, whether God's nature, goodness 
and willing the right are the same is irrelevant, provided they are essential. (An 
aside that interested me: Wittgenstein was troubled in the opposite way, that 
saying "God commands it because it is right" may be more superficial than 
saying "It is right because God commands it." See Freidrich Waismann, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis, p. 115, cited by Janik and Toulmin, Wittgens-
tein's Vienna, p. 194, Simon and Scuhuster, NY, 1973.) Nevertheless, I agree 
that it does make an explanatory advance to be able to spell out how the being 
of God and the basis of morality are the same. 
The last application says that because "it is possible for a logically necessary 
being to will that certain entities or events be contingent" there is a counter-
example to Rowe's principle that "For any contingent fact C, the fact which 
explains it cannot be a necessary fact, otherwise, C would not be contingent." 
The objection to Rowe is out of context. It equivocates on "contingent." Rowe's 
principle concerns "logical" contingency, in contrast to logical necessity, and 
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concerns explanation of a kind that necessitates the explanandum, and is thus, 
an instance of the general logical truth that the necessary does not imply the 
contingent. (The argument originates at p. 299-301 of Ross, Philosophical Theol-
ogy, Babbs Merrill, New York 1969, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1980.) The authors 
(see pp. 369,371-73), are using "contingent" in a way that involves "metaphysical 
contingency," and "mode of their existence" (pp. 373-75), as well as logical 
contingency. 
Moreover, Aquinas says, SG, I, 85, that God could not, by his will, have 
made "absolute necessity in things" and that contingency is required by the 
natures of the things God makes. This does not concern the logical notion 
involved in Rowe's principle .... In any case, what role does simplicity have in 
this application? 
University of Pennsylvania 
NOTES 
I. They also say Aquinas does not conceive of "contingency" in terms of differences across possible 
worlds, generally, but in terms of branching time-lines emanating from a single initial possible 
world-state. (p. 369) (That might be so for a creature whose "otherwise" requires its actual being, 
but not for God who is, no matter what, and has no time-line.) So it is unclear whether they regard 
him as holding something very close to their "weakening the claims basic to the doctrine of simplicity" 
or as being in disagreement with their proposed refinement (p. 371). 
2. Since the introduction of "absence of real distinction" seems to be a result of earlier commentaries, 
I think the commentators might have appreciated a more direct acknowledgement. 
3. God's nature is so-called by analogy in so far as it is the answer to "what is it?" But it is not, 
as with "being a human" related to being as capacity to realization, or as replicable in distinct 
substances. There is nothing at all in God like that. The authors recognize this (p. 370). 
4. I do not mean to imply that no de re possibilities and necessities fall within God's will; just the 
opposite. See my "God Creator of Kinds and Possibilities," forthcoming in a collection edited by 
Audi, R., and Wainwright, W., Cornell University Press and the detailed discussion of eternal truths 
and natural necessities in Creation forthcoming, Un. of Notre Dame Press. 
5. I do not use "subsists" in Aquinas' technical senses, but in a more everyday sense in which I'd 
say the 'being colored' of a red mark subsists in its being red. I do not mind "consists" here, as 
long as it is understood that it might have "consisted" in its being blue, say. So God's freedom 
might have consisted in another choosing, instead. "Consists" in such contexts has to be understood, 
not as conceptual inclusion, but as "same reality." 
Anything, say a choice, a determinate, that in occurring, IS a thing's having the determinable, 
say being free, and exhausts it in actuality because it is without successor or predecessor, is not 
really distinct from it. 
6. If the conditions for a real distinction are properly stated for Aquinas (no mean feat), they 
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manifest that there can be no real distinction between how-God-is-but-might-not-have-been and 
some-way-God-might-have been-but-is-not. To say "God might have been different" is not to say 
there IS some reality from which God is really different. 
